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Enemy Combatant Status Hearings:
Predicting the Right of Access by the Press and Public
,effrey . Koweek*
"[T]o the press alone, chequered as it is with
abuses, the world is indebted for all the
triumphs which have been gained by reason
and humanity, over error and oppression." -
James Madison'
"Gentlemen, I am sorry to find that some one
member of this body has been so neglectful of
the secrets of the Convention as to drop in the
State House a copy of their proceedings, which
by accident was picked up and delivered to me
this morning. I must entreat gentlemen to be
more careful, lest our transactions get into the
news papers and disturb the public response by
premature speculations." - George
Washington'
Freedom of the press is one of the richest traditions in the
United States and, along with freedom of speech, the right that is
most associated with protecting the integrity of our democratic
republic. Protecting the freedom of the press is of paramount
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law,
2006.
1. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 718 (1931) (citing JAMES
MADISON, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 MADISON'S WORKS 544).
But see ANTONY JAY, 'TIE OXFORD DICI ONARY OF POLITICAL QUOTATIONS
191 (1996) (attributing this quote to Thomas Jefferson).
2. 3 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 86 (3d ed. 1937). For corroboration, see George Washington's letter
to David Stuart dated July 1, 1787: "As the rules of the Convention prevent
me from relating any of the proceedings of it, and the gazettes contain more
fully than I could detail other occurrences of public notice, I have little to
communicate to you. ." Id. at 51.
importance for honest government, but the rights of the press have
never been absolute as evidenced by George Washington's quote
above. In recent years, issues concerning the freedom of the press
have focused on rights of access and information gathering rather
than the right to publish. This article evaluates the First
Amendment right of access to proceedings in which a United States
citizen is contesting his or her status as an enemy combatant. This
issue first arose in the aftermath of the June 2004 Harndi v.
Rumsfeld" decision, in which the United States government
detained Yaser Hamdi as an enemy combatant without
representation for more than two years until the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to hear an appeal from the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals.
Part I details the recent history of the freedom of the press
and summarizes the First Amendment right of access to news
gathering. This constitutional right to access, grounded in the First
Amendment, is a limited right, and its various permutations are still
evolving.4 One of the main components of the constitutional right
of access is that the First Amendment "protects the public and the
press from abridgment of their rights of access to information about
the operation of their government, including the Judicial Branch."'
But the "First Amendment does not guarantee the press a
constitutional right of special access to information not available to
the public generally."(, If the general public is excluded from a
crime scene, disaster area, or government proceeding, the press also
may be so restricted.' Thus, any mention in this article of a
constitutional or First Amendment right of access in this article
applies to both the press and the public.
Part II analyzes the division among the federal circuit courts
on the right of access to special interest deportation hearings in the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Special
interest deportation hearings are a subset of deportation hearings in
3. - U.S. . 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
4. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 1.S. 665. 682-84 (1972).
5. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 584 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
6. Branzbitrg, 408 U.S. at 684.
7. Id. at 684-85.
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which potential deportees are suspected of having ties to the 9/11
terrorist attacks. 's  They were established pursuant to a
memorandum by Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy calling
for a "complete information blackout along both substantive and
procedural dimensions" in the interests of national security!
Analyzing this circuit court "split" will provide guidance for the
framework under which press access can be evaluated for
proceedings to determine the enemy combatant status of a United
States citizen."
Part III describes the facts of Hamdi and analyzes the
United States Supreme Court's ruling on contested enemy
combatant status hearings. This section will discuss the possible
settings for contested enemy combatant status hearings, the likely
First Amendment right of access to each, and the impact of the
circuit split on special interest deportation hearings on the press'
right of access. This section will predict the press' constitutional
right of access in each of the possible adjudicative settings and show
how the constitutional right of access will likely be secondary to
national security concerns. Although the settlement between the
United States government and Hamdi renders this case moot, the
analysis remains relevant due to the global mobility of citizens, the
continuing war on terror, and the easily accessible and potentially
dangerous information available to everyone.
The tension between the constitutional right of access by
the press and deference to national security interests is but one
example of how the United States government is wrestling with the
proper balance between civil liberties and security in the aftermath
of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. These issues include
the extent to which constitutional liberties should be curtailed in an
8. North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003).
9. Id.
10. Previous cases involving citizens captured as enemy combatants did
not contest their status, as Justice Scalia made clear in his dissent in Hanldi.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, - U.S. 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2670 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 47 (1942) (holding that a man claiming
naturalized United States citizenship was an enemy belligerent as he admitted
enemy combatant status)): Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F.2d 429, 432 (10th Cir.
1956); In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 143-45 (9th Cir. 1946).
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effort to be safe and secure, the deference afforded to general or
specific claims by the federal government in order to promote
national security, and the impact the current war on terror will have
on personal freedoms. This article discusses one aspect of the
tension between liberty and security in the debate concerning the
constitutional right of access by the press.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
The First Amendment states that there shall be no law
abridging the freedom of the press." The freedom of the press to
publish is uncontroversial by the plain language of the United
States Constitution and has been upheld as a fundamental right
even against government claims of protecting national security 2
The freedom of the press to gather news and acquire information is
directly related to this freedom to publish. The Supreme Court has
held that "without some protection for the seeking out of news,
freedom of the press would be eviscerated. The exact meaning of
"some protection" is not completely clear, but the freedom to
gather news is an important function of living in a free and
democratic society in which one can challenge and publicize
governmental actions.'4
Other Constitutional protections for citizens exist that
promote open and transparent government. The First Amendment
states that no law shall be made "abridging the freedom of
speech .... [or] to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." The Sixth Amendment includes a right to a public
trial, thereby providing accountability of government operations
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971)
(per curiam) (holding that the government had not met its burden to curtail
the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing the leaked
Pentagon Papers detailing the uncertain and compromising foreign policy
decisions related to operations in Vietnam).
13. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
14. See Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633-634
(1975) (stating that the freedom of the press is a structural provision of the
Constitution and that the publishing business is a protected institution).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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and a check on the government." However, this article restricts
itself to the First Amendment right to publish.
The Supreme Court has, for instance, held that the press has
no greater right of access than that of the general public and that
traditionally closed proceedings such as internal political branch
meetings are not deemed to be accessible. 7 Additionally, in the
1970s, the Supreme Court upheld many limitations to the
constitutional right of access on military bases and in government-
controlled prisons."8 The 1970s was a turbulent time in this
country's history due to Vietnam and Watergate, and the press took
a leading role as the watchdog of government integrity and
honesty.") In 1979, the Supreme Court heard the first of five cases
in seven years that more fully addressed the press' constitutional
right of access.
The first case to reach the Supreme Court was one in which
Gannett newspaper publishers challenged a trial judge's ruling that
barred the press and the public from a pretrial suppression
hearing.2" The newspaper asserted First, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights as its constitutional basis for access despite the
fact that the defendant, prosecutor, and trial judge agreed that
closure was warranted for a fair trial. t The Supreme Court held
that -members of the public have no constitutional right under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to attend criminal trials."?2
Additionally, the Court concluded that the trial judge's
16. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
17. Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Def.. 762 F. Supp. 1558,
1571 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that the Supreme Court, while never directly
addressing the "role and limits of news gathering under the First Amendment
in a military context abroad," had ruled definitively on other limitations to
access rights of the press).
18. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (holding the
media right to access prisons is no different from - or greater than - that of the
general public); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828. 838 (1976) (holding that First
Amendment rights are not absolute on military bases because they arc not
public forums).
19. Jonathan L. Hafetz, The First Amendment and the Right of Access to
Deportation Proceedings, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 265, 269-70 (2004).




determination that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right
trumping the press' First Amendment rights was only temporary, as
the transcripts would be made available later.
The following year, the Supreme Court overturned its
holding in Gannett by holding that there is a constitutional right of
access to criminal trials. 4 In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, a
murder defendant, after three mistrials, wanted his fourth trial to be
closed, but the press wanted access. Chief Justice Burger's majority
opinion stressed that criminal trials are traditionally open to the
public and that denying this First Amendment right would
unnecessarily deprive the freedoms of speech and the press of their
important functioning for a "liberty-loving society."" Justice
Brennan, in a concurring opinion, introduced the idea that in
addition to a tradition of openness, the importance of public access
to the trial process itself must also be analyzed.' Specifically,
Justice Brennan argued: if access by the public and press served a
positive function for the procedure, it should be a factor in addition
to traditional openness. These positive functions include public
monitoring of government operations, ensuring due process, or
reinforcing public confidence in government operations. The
traditional openness and positive value arguments from Richmond
Newspapers eventually evolved into a two-part "experience and
logic" test used as the basis for the Court's rationale in three later
cases.
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, the Supreme
Court held in 1982 that a mandatory Massachusetts law closing rape
trials where the alleged victims were minors was unconstitutional
under the First Amendment according to the Richmond
Newspapers decision.! However, the Court held that the First
Amendment right of access was not absolute and that:
[t]he circumstances under which the press and
public can be barred from a criminal trial are
23. Id. at 393.
24. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia., 448 U.S. 555,580 (1980).
25. Jd. at 576-77.
26. [d. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
27. [d. at 593 (Brennan, J., concurring).
28. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982).
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limited; the State's justification in denying
access must be a weighty one. Where, as in the
present case, the State attempts to deny the
right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure
of sensitive information, it must be shown that
the denial is necessitated by a compelling
governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored
to serve that interest."
Thus, the First Amendment right of the press to access
courtrooms established in Richmond Newspapers can only be
curtailed if the countervailing interest can pass the strict scrutiny
test. Strict scrutiny is an exacting standard in which the government
must show that the interest by the challenged state action is
compelling and not just legitimate."' Additionally, there must be
clear evidence that the means used to achieve this interest are
narrowly tailored to the results."
Here, the Government arguably had compelling interests in
closing the proceedings to protect minors and provide
encouragement for others to come forward. However, the law was
not narrowly tailored to the Government's interests, as in camera
review would likely be sufficient to protect minors' identities.
Moreover, post-trial transcripts were available, thereby negating
the Government's claim of encouraging other minor victims to
come forward. Thus the mandatory closure was deemed not
narrowly tailored enough, as a case-by-case basis review was
sufficient to determine trial closures.
Chief Justice Burger, in a dissenting opinion, wrote that
there was no history of openness in these situations, that strict
scrutiny should not be applied, and that as long as state interests
29. Id. at 606-07.
30. E.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432. 440
(1985) (" The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest").
31. E.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995) ("To satisfy strict
scrutiny, the State must demonstrate that its districting legislation is narrowly
tailored to achieve an compelling interest").
32. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607-08.
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outweighed the impact on First Amendment rights, the
Massachusetts law should be upheld.'- In summary, the Court's
position after Globe Newspaper is that a First Amendment right to
access criminal trials exists as long as the Richmond Newspapers'
-experience and logic" test is met. This constitutional right of
access is not absolute, however, and can be restricted if the law
passes strict scrutiny.
In the following years, court rulings extended the
constitutional right to access within the context of criminal trials. In
1984, the Supreme Court held that a trial judge's refusal of press
access to voir dire transcripts of a criminal trial was unconstitutional
since a "presumption of openness may be overcome only by an
overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest. ,3 4 In this case, the trial judge made no findings that
restricting access to the trial transcripts would serve any higher
values.35 Furthermore, the court held that portions of the transcript
from the six-week voir dire proceeding that were "reasonably
entitled to privacy" could be sealed.
In a 1986 case, a defendant facing a murder charge
exercised his state right to a preliminary hearing rather than a
grand jury proceeding. 37 The trial court granted the defendant's
wish to not release the forty-one day hearing transcript." The
Supreme Court upheld the press' First Amendment rights, holding
that the qualified constitutional right to access criminal trials
extended to California's preliminary hearings, as they are
traditionally open and there is a "community therapeutic value" in
knowing that the proceedings are done fairly." Without access,
citizens may question the validity of governmental authority, which
would have a detrimental effect on society.
These decisions show that the Supreme Court has declared
33. Id. at 614-15 (Burger, C., dissenting).
34. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501. 510 (1984).
35. Id. at 503-04.
36. Id. at 513.
37. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 UJ.S. 1, 4-5 (1986).
38. [d.
39. [d. at 13.
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only a qualified First Amendment right to access exists for criminal
trials, voir dire proceedings, and preliminary hearings. However,
other courts have extended this constitutional right to civil trials
411
and administrative proceedings.4' The next stage of this discussion
involves an analysis of the different approaches two federal circuits
employed in analyzing the press's constitutional right to access
special interest deportation hearings.
II. SPLIT IN UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS ON
'SPECIAL INTEREST' DEPORTATION HEARINGS
A. Background
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States, there has been much public discussion about the proper
balance between liberty and security. The USA PATRIOT Act
47;
the Joint Resolution Authorizing the Use of Military Force on
September 18, 2001 '; and the November 13, 2001, Presidential
Military Order on the Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism 4 all provide examples
of national legislation curtailing individual liberties in the interest
of greater national security. This is not unprecedented. When the
United States has been attacked and considered to be at war in the
past, civil liberties have been suspended to an even greater extent.
For example, President Lincoln, during the Civil War, suspended
the writ of habeas corpus 45 and seized private property in the course
40. MARc A. FRANKLIN, ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW 749-50 (6th ed. 2000)
(citing Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984); NBC
Subsidiary (KNBC-'TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337 (Cal. 1999)).
41. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 695 (6th Cir. 2002).
42. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
43. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
44. Presidential Military Order on the Detention, I'reatment, and Trial
of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 883
(Nov. 16,2001).
45. See Fx parse Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 144-45 (C.C. Md. 1861) (No.
9,487).
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of a blockade of the South. 4'  Also, the creation of Japanese
internment camps via Executive Order during World War II was
upheld by the Supreme Court, which resulted in loss of both liberty
and property for Japanese citizens.' Notably, in both of these
instances, after the cessation of hostilities, federal laws have
recognized that these actions were unconstitutional. 4s
Currently, the United States government is engaged in a
' war against terrorism" involving known and unknown enemies for
an indeterminate length of time. It is beyond the scope of this
article to discuss fully the comparisons of the war against terror to
other more formal wars against nations where a definitive endpoint
can be foreseen. Rather, this article examines the issue of whether
the war on terror is an interest compelling enough to support a
mandatory closure of special interest deportation hearings, denying
the press and the public access to the proceedings, and if this result
is naturally extended to contested enemy combatant status
proceedings. Two circuits differ in their analysis of special interest
deportation hearings, but the background facts are similar.
On September 21, 2001, Chief Immigration Judge Michael
Creppy issued a directive (the "Creppy directive") requiring the
closure of deportation hearings involving all persons that might
have any connection with the terrorist attacks. The directive
required these "special interest" deportation hearings to be closed
to the press, the public, and friends and family members and
permitted no information on even the existence of the
proceedings.' The two circuit court cases discussed below involve
46. See The Brig Amy Warwick. 67 U.S. 635 (1863).
47. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214. 223-24 (1944).
48. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, __ U.S. _ 124 S. Ct. 2633. 2639 (2004)
(describing the legislative history of the Citizen Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 4001(a), passed in 1971 in part to repeal the Emergency Detention Act of
1950 which could lead to future internment camps as suffered by Japanese
citizens in World War 11); Ex parte Milligan, 71 IJ.S. 2, 125-26 (1866)
(acknowledging that during emergency situations such as war, suspending the
writ may be appropriate, but that the Constitution grants no further powers to
resolve the outcome in any emergency format). See generally H.R. Rep. No.
92-116 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1435.
49. See North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 199
(3d Cir. 2002); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683-84 (6th Cir.
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members of the press or public, who, after being denied access to
special interest deportation hearings, filed suits to have their
constitutional rights of access upheld.
B. The Sixth Circuit Holding: Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft
In December 2002, Rabih Haddad had overstayed his
tourist visa. His deportation hearing was classified as "special
interest" due to suspicions that the Islamic charity he operated
provided funding to terrorist organizations. Family members,
members of the public, several newspapers, and Congressman John
Conyers wanted to attend the hearing but were denied access.
Haddad was denied bail, detained, and had been in custody for the
six months preceding the Sixth Circuit's decision. The Detroit Free
Press, the plaintiff-newspaper, sought three things: a declaratory
judgment that the Creppy directive violated their First Amendment
right of access to the deportation hearings, an enjoinment of future
closures in Haddad's case, and a release of all previous documents
and transcripts. The district court granted an injunction, the
Government appealed, and the Court of Appeals heard oral
arguments on August 6, 2002."
The Sixth Circuit presented the following rationale for
determining that the First Amendment right of access was violated.
First, the Government has broad authority over substantive
immigration law, but the "Constitution meaningfully limits non-
substantive immigration laws and does not require special
deference to the Government." ' Furthermore, the United States
Supreme Court has "repeatedly allowed for meaningful judicial
review of non-substantive immigration laws where constitutional
rights are involved." 53 The Court also held that non-citizens who
lawfully enter and live in the United States are invested with the
same due process rights as citizens.1
4
2002).
50. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 681.
51. [d. at 684-85.
52. Jd. at 685.
53. Jd. at 687.
54. [d. at 688. See also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945)
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Additionally, the Sixth Circuit held that the Creppy
directive did not meet the deference to national security required to
override these procedural concerns, given that it encompasses a
"broad, indiscriminate range of information" and is not narrowly
targeted . Since the national security risk here is only described
broadly, it fails to satisfy the strict scrutiny test introduced in Globe
and therefore the Government has not provided a convincing
argument to curtail the press' First Amendment rights to access
these proceedings." '
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit found the Richmond
Newspapers "experience and logic" test applicable to deportation
hearings, as Circuit courts, including the Sixth Circuit, have used it
in non-criminal proceedings such as student disciplinary board
proceedings, civil trials, administrative hearings, and municipal
planning meetings) 7  The Sixth Circuit further noted that the
United States Supreme Court held that the many similarities
between judicial trials and deportation hearings warrant the use of
this two-prong test in determining constitutional rights of access.
Some of the similarities include the adversarial nature of the
proceedings, notice requirements, the existence of burden of proof
standards, habeas corpus rights, and a right to counsel.
The Sixth Circuit then applied the Richmond Newspapers
test to the facts, finding that the experience prong was satisfied
since deportation hearings traditionally have been open to the
public, albeit with exceptions, since 1882; and, that the numerous
revisions to the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
regulations have not undercut the required presumptive openness
of deportation proceedings. The second prong of the Richmond
Newspapers test was also met as the openness plays a positive role
in the hearings themselves. The openness serves as a check on the
("[D]eportation is a penalty... [mjeticulous care must be exercised lest the
procedure by which he is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential
standards of fairness").
55. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 692.
56. Jd. at 693.
57. Jd. at 695.
58. [d. at 698-99.
59. [d. at 701.
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Executive branch to ensure fair trials, proper administration of
justice, and a community therapeutic value. This community
therapeutic value reassures both society and an individual that
proper justice is administered and that individual liberties are not
being trampled."
Having found a First Amendment right of access under the
Richmond Newspapers test, the Sixth Circuit then held that the
Creppy directive was not narrowly tailored and that the
Government did not make a compelling argument why mandatory
closure was needed instead of a case-by-case decision regarding6]
secrecy. Here, the Government only had to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that Haddad had overstayed his visa and was
still in the United States. No evidence needed to be shown at all
relating to terrorist activities or national security." Thus,
mandatory closure was not necessary or narrowly tailored, and the
Government could petition for secrecy when needed.'" According
to the Sixth Circuit, the Government's claims of national security
concerns based on bits and pieces of information that could be put
together at an open proceeding to form "mosaic intelligence" was
too speculative to support such a drastic restriction of First
Amendment rights.
To summarize, the Sixth Circuit concluded that special
interest deportation hearings are procedural, not substantive, and
that the strict scrutiny standard must be met to curtail the
constitutional right of access. The Court found the Richmond
Newspapers two-prong test applicable to these special interest
deportation hearings and held that the two prongs were satisfied.
There is a tradition of openness (experience) and a positive value
(logic) to public access which grants a qualified constitutional right.
Finally, the Government has not satisfied strict scrutiny and thus
there can be no restriction on First Amendment rights.
C. The Third Circuit Holding: North Jersey Media Group, Inc v.
60. Id. at 703-04.
61. Id. at 707.





For three months beginning in November 2001, reporters
were denied docket information and access to deportation hearings
in Newark, New Jersey pursuant to the Creppy directive.J6 The
reporters, through their employer, North Jersey Media Group,
challenged the mandatory closure policy on First Amendment
grounds. They also argued that since detainees were not prevented
by the Creppy directive from releasing information that the secrecy
was ineffective anyway. 67 The United States District Court of New
Jersey, echoing the Sixth Circuit's analysis, applied the Richmond
Newspapers test. ( Given the similarities between criminal, civil,
and deportation proceedings, and the presumption of openness for
deportation hearings, the court found that a qualified First
Amendment right of access existed." The district court granted the
plaintiff-newspaper's injunction of the operation of the Creppy
directive because the mandatory closures were not narrowly
tailored . The Third Circuit reversed the district court's
injunction.''
The Third Circuit agreed with both the District Court of
New Jersey and the Sixth Circuit regarding special interest
deportation hearings, holding that "Richmond Newspapers is a test
broadly applicable to issues of access to government proceedings,
including removal" of persons already residing within the United
States." However, the Third Circuit claimed that access to political
branch proceedings - certain executive functions, military
operations, and even some Congressional records - did not have a
presumption of openness like civil or criminal trials. This idea of
necessary secrecy for executive functions was supported by both the
65. North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.
2002).
66. Id. at 203-04.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 204.
69. [d.
70. Id. at 204.
71. Id. at 198.
72. Id. at 208-09.
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Framers and the first Congress.7' The Third Circuit also noted that
many current administrative hearings - such as Social Security
disability claims, administrative disbarment proceedings, adverse
passport hearings, and other hearings of wrongdoing - may be
closed, either presumptively or for good cause. 4 This finding is
contrary to the Sixth Circuit's holding on the tradition of openness
to deportation hearings. Ultimately, the Third Circuit determined
that the "tradition of open deportation hearings is too recent and
inconsistent to support a First Amendment right of access."
' '
Traditionally, proceedings forbidding aliens from residing in
the country were divided into two types: exclusion for those seeking
entry into the United States and deportation for non-citizens
already residing in the United States." Any person within the
United States is afforded due process rights under the Constitution
but the same rights do not apply to those not yet in the country.77
Thus, exclusion hearings were deemed presumptively closed while
Congressional silence on the state of deportation hearings left a
presumption of openness. 7' However, for most of the last century,
deportation hearings have often been conducted in prisons,
hospitals, or private homes where there is no general right of public
access."9 Thus, according to the Third Circuit, deportation hearings
arguably do not meet the "unbroken, uncontradicted history" of
public access that Chief Justice Burger set as the standard in
73. [d. at 209-10. See also FERRAND, supra note 2 at 86.
74. North Jersey, 308 F.3d at 210. For proceedings that are
presumptively closed, see 12 C.F.R. § 19.1.99 (2005) (Office of Comptroller of
Currency); 12 C.F.R. § 263.97 (2005) (Federal Reserve Board of Governors).
22 C.F.R. § 51.87 (2005) (State Department). For proceedings that are
presumptively open but may be closed, see 5 C.F.R. § 185.132(d) (2005)
(Office of Personnel Management): 10 C.F.R. § 13.30(d) (2005) (Nuclear
Regulatory Commission); 13 C.F.R. § 142.21(d) (2005) (Small Business
Administration): 28 C.F.R. § 68.39(a) (2005) (Department of Justice); 31
C.F.R. § 500.713(a) (2005) (Office of Foreign Asset Control): 38 C.F.R. §
42.30(d) (2005) (Office of Veterans Affairs).
75. North.lersey, 308 F.3d at 211.





Richmond Newspapers."" This conclusion is in direct contrast to the
Sixth Circuit's holding, which concluded that deportation hearings
had a tradition of openness.
The Third Circuit then noted that the second prong of the
Richmond Newspapers logic test was a non-factor because
"whenever a court has found that openness serves community
values, it has concluded that openness plays a 'significant positive
role' in that proceeding. ' '  That is, whenever the Richmond
Newspapers experience test was satisfied, the proceeding in
question automatically passed the logic test because one could
always find some positive value supporting openness such as
fairness, a check on corrupt practices, or informed discussion of
government activities. The Third Circuit held that the
Government presented "substantial evidence that open deportation
hearings would threaten national security"' . and held that these
security concerns made the public nature of these proceedings fail
the logic test." While admitting that the Government's evidence
was speculative, the court held that the "Richmond Newspapers
logic prong is unavoidably speculative" as well. Thus, the Third
Circuit dismissed the logic prong as being non-determinative.
The national security interest plays a positive role in closing
these proceedings just as much as the logic prong plays a positive
role in opening the proceedings. These positive values cancel each
other out. Since the Third Circuit found no tradition of openness,
the constitutional right of access was not found. Consequently,
80. Id. at 212.
81. I. at 217.
82. [d.
83. [d. at 219. The Government's evidence was the Watson Declaration,
filed by the Counterterrorism Chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigations.
The Watson Declaration noted that information and insights coming from
open trials might warn terrorists of investigative tactics and knowledge that
the government has or does not have. Even small pieces of information could
be put together and terrorists could learn and adapt their strategies. The
Watson Declaration also said case-by-case closures were not reliable as
immigration judges could not be expected to be experts in small bits of
information that might tip off terrorists. The Watson Declaration is
considered "substantial evidence" by the Third Circuit. Id. at 218-19.
84. [d. at 219.
85. Jd. at 212 (italics added).
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there was no need to even address the issue of whether the Creppy
directive passes a strict scrutiny test or whether the district court's
use of a national injunction was too broad since it failed to find a
tradition of openness. The Third Circuit held that the Creppy
directive, which required mandatory closures of special interest
deportation hearings, was constitutional.
In summary, special interest deportation hearings are now
closed nationally except in the Sixth Circuit, even though all circuits
are in agreement that the two-prong Richmond Newspapers test is
proper for determining whether a qualified First Amendment right
of access exists to any proceeding. The Sixth and Third Circuits
agreed on the use of the experience and logic test but differed in
their interpretation of the history of deportation hearings.
Furthermore, this issue is not soon to be resolved, as the United
States Supreme Court declined to adjudicate the issue in the spring
of 2003."
III. THE PROSPECTS OF ACCESS TO ENEMY COMBATANT STATUS
HEARINGS UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
Yaser Esam Hamdi, born in Louisiana but raised in Saudi
Arabia, was captured in Afghanistan alongside Taliban troops in
2001, classified as an "enemy combatant," and held by the United
States government for over two years without formal charges or
proceedings.' 7 Hamdi contested his classification and detention
through the federal system to the Supreme Court."
86. North Jersey Media, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003).
87. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, U.S. - 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2635-36 (2004)
(plurality opinion).
88. Id. at 2633.
Harndi's father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in June 2002,
and legal counsel was ordered for Hamdi. The Unites States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit reversed this order, holding that the district court failed
to give proper deference to national security and intelligence interests. The
Fourth Circuit remanded for a "deferential inquiry into Hamdi's status" and
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The Supreme Court's plurality held that Congress'
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) did grant the
President the power to detain Hamdi' despite the fact that no
specific language was present in the Joint Resolution."' The Court
introduced the term "enemy belligerent '""' and recognized that a
citizen is just as dangerous to the United States as a non-citizen if
he takes up arms against the United States and is then released
from custody.i, Moreover, as long as active operations are ongoing,
the continued detention is lawful pursuant to the AUMF, as the
Authorization prevents detainees from returning to battle against
the United States.
9"
noted that his detention was lawful if he was indeed an enemy combatant. Id.
at 2636.
The district court, on remand, found that the government's only evidence
(the "Mobbs Declaration") was insufficient to justify Hamdi's detention and
held that it amounted to "little more than the government's 'say-so."' The
district court ordered an in camera review, requiring the Government to
produce evidence sufficient to conduct a "meaningful judicial review." Id. at
2637.
The government appealed and the Fourth Circuit reversed the order,
holding that the Mobbs Declaration, "if accurate," provided a sufficient
Constitutional basis for detention according to Article I and ii war powers.
Id. at 2638. The United States Supreme Court ultimately vacated the
judgment and remanded the case back to the district court. Id. at 2639.
89. The plurality opinion, written by Justice O'Connor and joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, held that the
detention was Congressionally authorized. Id. at 2639. Justice Thomas, in his
dissent, also concluded that the AUMF authorized Hamdi's detention, thereby
providing a majority of the court on this particular issue. Jd. at 2683. See
Authorization for Use of Military Force, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
90. Jlandi. 124 S. Ct. at 2641. This holding was pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
4001(a) which states that "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise
detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress." 18
U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2004). 'This statute was passed in 1971 as part of a bill to
repeal the Emergency Detention Act of 1950, fearing a reprisal of internment
camps that arose in this country during World War 11. See H.R. Rep. No. 92-
116 (1971), reprinted in 1971 IJ.S.C.C.A.N. 1435. The Supreme Court relied
on Ex parte Quirin, which held that capture and detention of combatants, both
lawful and unlawful are "important incidents of war" that were universally
agreed upon. 317 U.S. 1,35-36 (1942).
91. tIamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640 (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37).
92. Id. at 2641.
93. Id. at 2642.
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The Supreme Court recognized that the military has the
authority to detain citizens who concede their status as enemy
combatants, and that those engaged in armed conflict against the
United States forfeit any additional due process protections
guaranteed to citizens. 4 However, Hamdi was contesting his status
as an enemy. This distinguishes his case from the facts of two
previous Supreme Court rulings.
The Supreme Court held that "Hamdi was properly before
an Article III court to challenge his detention under 28 U.S.C. §
2241 [habeas corpus].",( The Court then determined the
appropriate nature of the process and standard of proof required
for the proceedings. The Government argued that the courts
should "review its determination that a citizen is an enemy
combatant under a very deferential 'some evidence' standard."
'9,
However, Hamdi contended that these proceedings should be
similar to a criminal trial in which the Government's evidence
against Hamdi would be considered hearsay and the already-
ordered extensive discovery would be required." The Supreme
Court weighed the national security interest, deference to the
Executive branch in wartime, and the due process rights of citizens.
It ultimately held that:
while the full protections that accompany
challenges to detentions in other settings may
94. Id. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38 (finding that a U.S. citizen who was
captured along with foreigners in a bungled attempt to invade the United
States is "subject to trial and punishment" by a military tribunal). Id. at 37.
See also Presidential Military Order: Detention. Treatment. and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 883
(Nov. 16, 2001) (authorizing detainment and trial of non-citizens by the
military).
95. Compare Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 122 (1866) (finding that
Milligan was detained due to conspiring, affording aid, and inciting, but never
took up arms against the United States and was never present at any formal
battles) with Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20 (holding that Haupt, a captured member of
the German forces, conceded enemy combatant status and never contested it.
Additionally, he claimed to be a naturalized citizen because he was not born in
the United States).
96. tIamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2644.
97. [d. at 2645.
98. [d. at 2646.
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prove unworkable and inappropriate in the
enemy-combatant setting, the threats to
military operations posed by a basic system of
independent review are not so weighty as to
trump a citizen's core rights to challenge
meaningfully the Government's case and to be
heard by an impartial adjudicator.
The Court further held that although the "some evidence"
standard is inadequate, a military tribunal is also eligible to
adjudicate these proceedings as long as it is "appropriately
authorized and properly constituted..... However, since the writ
was received by the district court, it is the district court's
responsibility to "ensure that the minimum requirements of due
process are achieved.""" Finally, the Supreme Court recognized
and anticipated that the Article III court will proceed cautiously in
matters of national security."2
The Hamdi case presents a unique situation concerning the
constitutional right of access to a new type of proceeding in which a
party contests his status as an enemy combatant. Three types of
proceedings are possible results of the Hamdi decision: a military
tribunal proceeding, an Article III United States District Court
hearing, or a district court proceeding similar to a special interest
deportation hearing. This article contends that the First
Amendment right of access to any resulting proceeding would be
severely limited due to the deference afforded to national security
99. Id. at 2650.
100. Id. at 265 1.
101. Id. at 265 1.
102. Id. at 2652. Despite the numerous legal proceedings and rulings, a
federal district court will most likely not adjudicate Hamdi's status as an
enemy combatant. On September 22, 2004, a negotiated settlement was
announced whereby Hamdi would be released if he renounced his United
States citizenship, returned to Saudi Arabia, agreed to travel restrictions to
certain Middle Eastern countries including Afghanistan, and agreed not to sue
the United States. Eric Lichtblau, U.S., Bowing to Court Ruling, Will Free
'Enemy Combatant', N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at Al. However, as of
October 8, 2004, the deal still had not been finalized due to questions
concerning the continued supervision of Hamdi. A Very Bad Deal, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2004, at A26.
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concerns.
B. Access to Enemy Combatant Status Hearing as a Military
Tribunal
The most straightforward analysis accounts for the
possibility of adjudication by a military tribunal since the Supreme
Court did leave that possibility open.1" If a military tribunal
adjudicated an enemy combatant hearing, the press would likely
not have access as the Richmond Newspapers test would not have
any weight outside of an Article III court. Military tribunals are
governed by different rules than civil courts. 114 Fewer due process
claims are likely to be upheld in a military tribunal even if
"appropriately authorized and properly constituted." 105 According
to Army Regulations 190-8, 1-6 (b), "[a] competent tribunal shall
determine the status of any person not appearing to be entitled to
prisoner of war status who has committed a belligerent act or has
engaged in hostile activities in aid of enemy armed forces...
The press would likely have no right of access, as these
"[p]roceedings shall be open except for deliberation and voting...
or other matters which would compromise security if held in the
open."1 7  Thus, these restrictions would likely deny any First
Amendment right of access to a military adjudication of enemy
combatant status.
The press and public, however, could likely raise legal and
vocal opposition to military tribunal adjudication as long as civil
courts are open and functioning.11 Although the President could
103. lanidi. 124 S. Ct. at 2651.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2651-52.
106. Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees
and Other Detainees, Army Regulation 190-8, § 1-6 (b) (1997).
107. Id. at § 1-6 (e)(3).
108. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2. 123 (1866) (holding that if civil
courts are available, all persons are privileged to a trial by jury and not to a
military tribunal). See also Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683-
84 (6th Cir. 2002) (reporting that the potential special interest deportee's
family, Congressperson, and local media groups all protested the closed nature
of the hearing).
2005]
cite national security interests as a valid reason to keep the
proceedings closed, there are political risks in such an apparent
attempt at violating separation of powers by commandeering the
proceedings from the judiciary."" In any case, if a contested enemy
combatant status hearing were to be adjudicated in a military
tribunal, there would be no First Amendment right of access for the
press or the public.
C. Access to Enemy Combatant Status Hearing in an Article III
Court
The Hamdi proceedings would be a case of "first
impression" if the federal court system were to resolve Hamdi's
enemy combatant status. Two major considerations for the court
would include balancing national security interests against the First
Amendment right of access for the public and press, and
determining the tradition of such proceedings under the Richmond
Newspapers test in light of the Third and Sixth Circuit's
disagreement over the history of deportation hearings. The current
war on terror casts a long shadow over security issues and it would
tend to tilt the balance between liberty and security away from a
constitutional right of access.
The United States Supreme Court in Hamdi did remand the
case back to the district court, an Article III court, for an in camera
review. This review affords the trial judge great discretion in the
determination of how much of the proceedings and transcripts can
be accessed by the press. The Supreme Court's only guidance is to
honor the minimum requirements of due process and proceed
cautiously in national security matters."" It is likely, for interests of
judicial efficiency, that the proceedings would be closed, but that
the transcripts could be available after review by the government to
109. The political risks could include: impeachment, Congressional
censure, loss of political capital, Congressional retaliation via the budgetary
process or the Senate blocking appointments. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 701-02 (1988) (Scalia, J.. dissenting) (arguing that the effects of
political consequences would be substantial under a mere suspicion of law-
breaking by the President or Attorney General).
110. Hiamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2651-52.
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remove sensitive information. The trade-off between monitoring
every detail the government insists is sensitive with the interests of
a fair and speedy trial, would likely spur a more secret
determination with a review of the transcript afterward.
D. Comparing Enemy Combatant Status Hearings to 'Special
Interest' Deportation Hearings
There are many similarities between a special interest
deportation hearing and a contested enemy combatant status
hearing. The facts surrounding Hamdi and Detroit Free Press are
analogous in many respects. Pending the completion of his
settlement with the United States government, Hamdi will
renounce his citizenship and be deported to Saudi Arabia. ' While
citizens are granted more rights than non-citizens, persons already
residing in the United States are given greater due process rights
than those not on United States soil.'2 Hamdi is a citizen but is
contesting his status of being an enemy-combatant - as opposed to
being a special interests deportee who is a non-citizen, currently
residing in the United States, suspected of terror-related activities.
These two situations are analogous in the type of person being
judged and the similarity in suspected activity.
Comparing Hamdi and Detroit Free Press, the similarities
between enemy combatant and special interest deportation
hearings are clear: the Executive branch is bringing the suits for
national security reasons, they both involve individuals suspected of
supporting terrorist activity, and both men are currently in the
United States. In addition, they are both in a gray area regarding
citizenship. Haddad is a "person" protected under the Due Process
Clause since he is currently living in the Untied States. Hamdi,
however, has not lived in the United States for years, but is a citizen
due to the location of his birth. This classification of "citizen"
affords him greater protections but distinguishing the validity of
111. See supra note 102.
112. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("IN]or shall any person... be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"). It specifically says
person, not citizen, and refers to anyone within the United States.
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these greater protections under a normative analysis is not simple."'
The distinguishing facts of the two cases - citizen versus non-citizen,
allegations of taking up arms against United States troops versus
funding terrorist organizations, capture in foreign country versus
detention in the United States - arguably do not outweigh the
applicability of the Richmond Newspapers test to the Hamdi
proceedings. Additionally, nothing in the Sixth or Third Circuit's
rationales prevent the two-prong test application to enemy
combatant hearings.
The Sixth and Third Circuits agree that the Richmond
Newspapers test is appropriate to determine if a First Amendment
right of access exists in special interest deportation hearings. It is
then a seemingly natural extension to consider the application of
the Richmond Newspapers two prong test to contested enemy
combatant status hearings.
If the hearings were in federal district court, the Richmond
Newspapers "experience and logic" test should be employed to
determine if a qualified right of access exists. Federal Courts of
Appeals have consistently determined its broad applicability to
criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings. ' 4 On the one hand,
criminal habeas corpus proceedings are presumptively open"' and
the openness serves a positive role in ensuring fair treatment of a
citizen's due process rights. This was the Sixth Circuit's position in
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft concerning the special interest
deportation hearing."'', But the current state of the federal circuit
split means that only if Hamdi was detained within the Sixth
Circuit, for example on a naval brig on Lake Michigan, would this
analysis even apply.
The later Third Circuit decision in North Jersey Media
Group, found no tradition of openness in deportation hearings." 7 It
113. For example, Hamdi is protected by the Citizen Non-Detention Act
whereas Haddad is not. See supra note 48. Haddad is subject to the
Presidential Military Order on the Detention, 'Ireatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism whereas Hamdi is not. See supra
note 42 and accompanying text.
114. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 695 (6th Cir. 2002).
115. See Mason v. Schriver, 14 F. Supp. 2d 321, 324-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
116. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 702.
117. North Jersey Media, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198. 212-13 (3d Cir.
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is unlikely that the first contested enemy combatant status
proceeding would be found presumptively open. The distinguishing
feature here is that the Third Circuit has upheld the
constitutionality of the mandatory closure for special interest
deportation hearings that are directly connected with September 11
and the war on terror. In Hamdi, the United States Supreme Court
held that a "citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification
as an enemy combatant must receive notice ... and a fair
opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a
neutral decisionmaker." Furthermore, "enemy combatant
proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential
to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict." '
Presumptions in favor of the Government would not offend the
Constitution and hearsay may be accepted as evidence which would
include the Government's evidence against Hamdi.' However, the
"some evidence" standard is not appropriate since Fifth
Amendment due process rights are the procedural standard for a
United States citizen.'-' The Court further held that the district
court would proceed with caution and "pay proper heed both to
matters of national security that might arise in an individual case
and to the constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties
that remain vibrant even in times of security concerns."'
Safeguarding essential liberties certainly could include the
First Amendment right of access to the contested enemy combatant
status as long as national security concerns were properly heeded.
However, the Third Circuit's analysis of the logic prong would work
against a presumptive openness to the proceedings, considering the
Supreme Court's directives to pay proper heed to security concerns.
The Third Circuit, as discussed previously, held that a positive value
to open proceedings could always be found and that the test was
unconvincing and non-determinative. Thus, even if the experience
2002).
118. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, - U.S. -, 124 S. Ct. 2633. 2648 (2004).
119. Id. at 2649.
120. Id. See supra note 88 for description of the procedural history and
the government's evidence.
121. Id. at 2651.
122. Id. at 2652.
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prong was established, the Third Circuit would likely curtail the
right of access due to the countervailing national security interest
for secrecy.
In Ham di, the Government's case includes specific
allegations about his activities. This evidence is likely to be
admitted as credible evidence as per the Supreme Court's ruling on
hearsay evidence. In Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, there was only
a generic and broad assertion of national security interests in
Haddad's special interest deportation hearing. :3 The more specific
allegations in Hamdi and the existence of stronger ties to the
Taliban and al-Qaeda should be sufficient evidence for a court to
hold that the national security interest is best served by limiting the
First Amendment right of access.
United States officials released Hamdi because the
Government had "no interest in detaining enemy combatants
beyond the point that they pose a threat to the U.S. and our
allies.",1 24 Since he was no longer a threat, there seems to be no
reason why the transcripts of the hearings could not be released. In
future cases, it seems probable that national security interests
would keep a citizen's contested enemy combatant proceedings
closed during active military operations. There does not seem to be
a powerful reason to curtail the First Amendment right to access
the transcripts as most of the details about capture and past travel
does not seem damaging to national security or difficult to strike
from the transcript. Additionally, there is no justification to
prevent access to the transcripts after military operations had
ceased. ' To summarize, contested enemy combatant status
proceedings are likely to be closed based on the Third Circuit
decision and the fact that First Amendment rights are traditionally
counterbalanced by national security interests, especially in times of
active military operations.
123. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 692 (6th Cir. 2002).
124. See Lichtblau, supra note 102.
125. The question of how long records should be kept sealed during a
war on terror with no determinate length is beyond the scope of this article.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Richmond Newspapers test, as developed by the Sixth
and Third Circuits in their holdings on special interest deportation
hearings, provides a viable framework to evaluate the constitutional
right to access enemy combatant status hearings for United States
citizens. The Supreme Court in Hamdi has emphasized the need
for deference to the government in wartime, but that any extra
deference still must be balanced by constitutional guarantees of
individual liberties. Since September 11, 2001, the United States
government has typically endorsed national security interests over
the protection of individual freedoms in an attempt to insure
greater safety against future terrorist attacks. 2' One can only
speculate as to when or if this balance will shift again.
When balancing the qualified First Amendment right of
access with national security interests in contested enemy
combatant status hearings, national security concerns will likely and
appropriately be accorded greater weight during active military
operations. This may or may not require mandatory closure, but
the Supreme Court is clear that appropriate deference needs to be
made to security interests even at the expense of First Amendment
rights of the press and public. In regard to this one facet of the
ongoing struggle between liberty and security, a citizen's contested
enemy combatant status proceeding is likely to be presumptively
closed during wartime. However, there is no compelling reason to
restrict access to court records after the abatement of hostilities or
when the information no longer poses any risk to current
operations. Access to government proceedings or records after
wartime activity has always served as a collective check on our
actions in stressful or dangerous times. Yet, our first response is
legitimately, to "insure domestic tranquility, provide for the
common defence ... and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity." , The three branches of government
have a responsibility to protect our people, Constitution, and
country. Thus, as evidenced by this country's historical practices
126. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
127. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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during wartime and the prevailing Third Circuit decision curtailing
the constitutional right of access, First Amendment rights can be
temporarily restricted by national security interests.
